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Kant on apriority, syntheticity, and judgments

Hoke Robinson

pp. 225-247

Of the various passages revised or completely rewritten for the Critique of Pure Reason's second (1787) edition, scholars have focused primarily on the Deduction, the Refutation of Idealism, the Paralogisms, the Preface, and to a lesser extent on the Aesthetic. The Introduction too underwent a revision — it nearly doubled in length — but relatively little attention has been paid to the question of why Kant thought this revision advisable. This is perhaps understandable: the alteration consists almost entirely of an expansion of the treatment of synthetic a priori knowledge, for the most part simply taken over (frequently word-for-word) from the 1783 Prolegomena. And although a great deal of the Prolegomena is devoted to Kant's indignant rejection of the Garve-Feder review of the 1781 Critique, the passages adopted for the B-Introduction seem independent of this reaction.1

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9446-2_15

Full citation:

Robinson, H. (2000)., Kant on apriority, syntheticity, and judgments, in O. K. Wiegand, R. J. Dostal, L. Embree, J. Kockelmans & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Phenomenology on Kant, German idealism, hermeneutics and logic, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 225-247.

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