The metaepistemology of knowing-how

Cheng-Hung Tsai

pp. 541-

Knowing-how is currently a hot topic in epistemology. But what is the proper subject matter of a study of knowing-how and in what sense can such a study be regarded as epistemological? The aim of this paper is to answer such metaepistemological questions. This paper offers a metaepistemology of knowing-how, including considerations of the subject matter, task, and nature of the epistemology of knowing-how. I will achieve this aim, first, by distinguishing varieties of knowing-how and, second, by introducing and elaborating the concept of hybrid knowing-how, which entails a combination of a ground-level ability and a meta-level perspective on that ability. The stance I wish to advocate is that the epistemology of knowing-how is a normative discipline whose main task is to study the nature and value of human practical intelligence required to do things in a particular manner.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-011-9208-0

Full citation:

Tsai, C. (2011). The metaepistemology of knowing-how. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4), pp. 541-.

This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.