On-line false belief understanding qua folk psychology?

Martin Capstick

pp. 27-40

In this paper, I address Mitchell Herschbach's arguments against the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Central to Herschbach's arguments is the introduction of Michael Wheeler's distinction between "on-line' and "off-line' intelligence to the debate on social understanding. Herschbach uses this distinction to describe two arguments made by the phenomenological critics. The first is that folk psychology is exclusively off-line and mentalistic. The second is that social understanding is on-line and non-mentalistic. To counter the phenomenological critics, Herschbach argues for the existence of on-line false belief understanding. This demonstrates that folk psychology is not restricted to off-line forms and that folk psychology is more widespread than the phenomenological critics acknowledge. In response, I argue the on-line/off-line distinction is a problematic way of demarcating the phenomenological critics from orthodox accounts of folk psychology.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-012-9270-2

Full citation:

Capstick, M. (2013). On-line false belief understanding qua folk psychology?. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1), pp. 27-40.

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