Repository | Journal | Volume | Articles
(2006) Husserl Studies 22 (3).
The referent of the transcendental and indexical "I" is present non-ascriptively and contrasts with "the personal I" which necessity is presenced as having properties. Each is unique but in different ways. The former is abstract and incomplete until taken as a personal I. The personal I is ontologically incomplete until it self-determines itself morally. The "absolute Ought" is the exemplary moral self-determination and it finds a special disclosure in "the truth of will." Simmel's situation ethics is useful for making more precise Husserl's ethical position.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s10743-006-9009-4
Full citation:
Hart, J.G. (2006). The absolute ought and the unique individual. Husserl Studies 22 (3), pp. 223-240.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.