(2016) Husserl Studies 32 (2).

Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological idealism

Nikolaj Losskij

Translated by Frédéric Tremblay

pp. 167-182

This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky's "Tpaнcцeндeнтaльнo-фeнoмeнoлoгичecкiй идeaлизмъ Гyccepля" (Husserl's Transcendental-Phenomenological Idealism), published in the émigré journal Пyть (The Way) in 1939. In this article, Lossky presents and criticizes Husserl's transcendental idealism. Like many successors of Husserl's "Göttingen School," Lossky interprets Husserl's transcendental idealism as a Neo-Kantian idealism and he criticizes it on the ground that it leads to a form of solipsism. In light of his own epistemology (intuitivism) and his metaphysical system (ideal-realism), he also claims that, although Husserl is more radical than Descartes in his methodological doubt, he is not radical enough, because his abstention from existential judgment with regard to the external world is itself an existential judgment. In this regard, Lossky affirms that his own critically-informed defense of naive realism is in fact more radical than Husserl's transcendental idealism. (Frédéric Tremblay)

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-015-9183-3

Full citation:

Losskij, N.O. (2016). Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological idealism. Husserl Studies 32 (2), pp. 167-182.

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