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In this chapter, the nonpositivist conception of law is analysed in terms of its jurisprudential correctness and practical usefulness in the context of constructing an adequate, integrated conception of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law norms. The reflections begin with a discussion on some general methodological objections against the nonpositivist definitions of law proposed by Ralf Dreier and Robert Alexy. Then we analyse the specific objections, formulated from the perspective of legal theory and legal practice and referring to the method of constructing the nonpositivist definitions of law adopted by Dreier and Alexy. In light of the presented analyses, it is shown that nonpositivism does not offer any acceptable conception of legal validity. The undertaken criticism also results in the conclusion that the concept of legal validity should be defined in a detached and axiologically impartial way. It should be emphasised that this conclusion by no means constitutes a compromise between the standpoints of legal positivism and those of anti-positivists, in particular relating to natural law theories, but it allows us to go beyond their continuous disputes over the nature of law.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-27688-0_5

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