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(2014) Mind, values, and metaphysics II, Dordrecht, Springer.
A long-standing debate surrounds the question as to what justifies memory judgements. According to the Past Reason Theory (PastRT), these judgements are justified by the reasons we had to make identical judgements in the past, whereas the Present Reason Theory claims that these justifying reasons are to be found at the time we pass the memory judgements. In this chapter, I defend the original claim that, far from being exclusive, these two theories should be applied to different kinds of memory judgements. The PastRT offers the most appealing account of justified propositional memory judgements, while the Present Reason Theory provides the best approach to justified episodic memory judgements. One outcome of my discussion is thus that memory is not epistemologically unified and my argument in favour of this conclusion connects with the issues of internalism, reliabilism and the basing relation.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_12
Full citation:
Teroni, F. (2014)., The epistemological disunity of memory, in A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, values, and metaphysics II, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 183-202.
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