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(2014) Mind, values, and metaphysics II, Dordrecht, Springer.
It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. Given that deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the bigger the gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the lesser it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. After having presented the main differences between evaluative and deontic concepts, and shown that there is more than a superficial difference between the two kinds, the chapter turns to the question of the normativity of evaluative concepts. It will become clear that, even if these concepts have different functions, there are a great many ties between evaluative concepts, on one hand, and the concepts of ought and of reason, on the other.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_3
Full citation:
Tappolet, C. (2014)., The normativity of evaluative concepts, in A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, values, and metaphysics II, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 39-54.
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