Repository | Book | Chapter
(1986) Cognition and fact, Dordrecht, Springer.
Ludwik Fleck situated himself epistemologically in opposition to the two most prominant schools of the philosophy of science of his time: the Logical Positivism of Carnap, Schlick and others of the Vienna Circle, and the Historicism of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Jerusalem and the sociologists of knowledge (46-51)1. A brief statement of where he stood with respect to each is helpful.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-4498-5_15
Full citation:
Heelan, P.A. (1986). Fleck's contribution to epistemology, in Cognition and fact, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 287-307.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.