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In Chapter 1 of The Problem of Rationality entitled "The Problem of Objectivity," Donald Davidson establishes an argument to the effect that thought – in the sense of a thinking activity that makes truth claims about its objects – is dependent on the concept of objectivity (Davidson, 2004, pp. 3–18). Davidson's reasoning is pretty straightforward and it would in my view be difficult to dispute it. I have no intention of doing so; instead, I endorse its basic conclusions. Davidson's argument runs roughly as follows: To think means, among other things, to use concepts in various ways, for instance in making judgments, attributing properties to objects, characterizing situations or events, etc. None of this would be possible, however, without also possessing the concept of truth, since making statements or entertaining propositions of this kind means to make a truth claim. To think, then, would be impossible without being aware of the difference between truth and falsity, since such thoughts or propositions must necessarily be either true or false (independently of the question whether their truth or falsity can ever be established). Making a truth claim presupposes an understanding of the distinction between truth and falsity, since to claim something to be true also means to be aware of the possibility of getting it wrong.

DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-3622-3_1

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