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In Beschreibung des Menschen [Description of Humankind], Blumenberg claims that consolation [Tröst] "played a decisive role in anthropogenesis', that it made the unbearableness of human contingency bearable (2006, p. 626). Although consolation may be a pat on the back when times are bad, its anthropological function is complex. Consolation embraces and soothes the existential vulnerability for which there ultimately is no solace [Untröstlichkeit]. Consolation presupposes a complex intersubjective and cognitive reflexivity as well as an empathic perspective- taking capacity, which is a source of ethical reflection (2006, p. 651).¹ And although consolation is not equivalent to care, as for example in Heidegger's ontology or in the ethics of care literature, care for oneself and for others, as well as cooperation (ideally) depend on a capacity for consolation. That is, they depend on being able to put oneself empathically in the shoes of others, which is the precursor to compassion. This is normatively significant, for as Blumenberg states in Work on Myth, "Only an assessment of the risk involved in the human mode of existence makes it possible to discuss and to evaluate functionally the behavior that was serviceable in mastering it, and to take seriously the tentative inclination to be able to avail ourselves of such serviceability again' (1985, p. 111).

DOI: 10.1057/9781137500885_4

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