Daring to believe
metacognition, epistemic agency and reflective knowledge
In this paper, I will be arguing for a view of knowledge as a true belief that manifests a competent (epistemic) agency. Beyond a mere juxtaposition of performing skills, epistemic competent agency requires an integration of faculties at a personal level that is sufficient to evaluate the agent's epistemic risk in particular situations. I will propose that, in order to meet this requirement, agency must scale to a personal level where the agent's engagement in epistemic situations manifests a competent endorsement of her beliefs. This view can deal with the predicaments of Virtue Epistemology in a naturalistic atmosphere by changing the emphasis from representation to agency, and by considering knowledge as an expression of achievement. This interpretation faces two related problems: first, the issue of self-knowledge in agency, and second, the problem of the integration of competencies from the personal standpoint of a unified agent. In this paper, I will only be dealing with the second problem.
Broncano, F. (2014)., Daring to believe: metacognition, epistemic agency and reflective knowledge, in A. Fairweather (ed.), Virtue epistemology naturalized, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 49-66.
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