We owe it to Sigwart!
a new look at the content/object distinction in early phenomenological theories of judgment from Brentano to Twardowski
In a series of articles, Dale Jacquette has offered the following picture of Twardowski's contribution to Brentano's theory of intentionality. Brentano made no distinction between the content and the object of mental acts: he "seems to place the real world beyond the reach of thought' (Jacquette 1990: 181, Jacquette 2004: 107; see also Jacquette 2006: 12). By distinguishing sharply between content and object instead, Twardowski went beyond Brentano (although, contrary to what others claim, he was not the first Brentanian to do so).
Betti, A. (2013)., We owe it to Sigwart!: a new look at the content/object distinction in early phenomenological theories of judgment from Brentano to Twardowski, in M. Textor (ed.), Judgement and truth in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 74-96.
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